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Thank you very much. It’s terrific to be here, and thanks to all of you who
have worked so hard to make this event come about.
In many ways, all of us here today will be telling different versions of the
same story—in one way or another, we’re all trying to describe the same set of
phenomena as we contemplate the ways in which norms about humanitarian
intervention have both evolved and been challenged over the last 20 or so years.
My own internal working title for my remarks has been “Evolving Norms,
Fragmenting Consensus,” as I think about humanitarian intervention and the
Responsibility to Protect.
Most of you here today have taken international law. As you know, every
introductory international law course talks about the sources of international law.
Specifically, you spend some time talking about customary international law, or
CIL. Again, as you know, to determine the contours of customary international
law, we look both to state practice and to “opinio juris”: that is, the degree to
which states are acting in a certain way out of a sense of legal obligation, rather
than out of mere habit or convenience.1
Traditionally, the evolution of customary international law was understood
as a gradual process: in some idealized model, we might see first a few states, and
then a few more, implicitly agreeing to follow a practice, and then we would
gradually begin to see additional states doing the same thing. 2 We would also
gradually accumulate evidence that these various states are acting in such a way
because they consider themselves legally bound to do so. Then, over time, we’ll
see more and more states following suit both in word and deed, until at some
point we can say with a great deal of confidence that such and such has evolved
into a binding norm of customary international law.
That’s the idealized process through which norms of customary
international law develop. In real life, of course, it’s rarely so neat and tidy. In
fact, much of the time, the evolution of customary international law looks less like
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DAN KUWALI, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 4(h)
INTERVENTION 24 (2011).
2
See Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 662, 665–67
(1953) (discussing the development of international law and the competing elements of “usage”
(patterned actions) and opinio juris).

a gradual, trouble-free emergence of consensus than a continual process of
contestation—a continual process of resistance and conflict between states, if you
will. By “conflict” I don’t necessarily mean armed force, but rather diplomatic
conflict of all sorts: dueling demarches, dueling public statements, and so on.
Norms relating to humanitarian intervention offer a typical example. We
are in a period in which we are seeing a norm struggling to emerge, if you will,
but that process is not a smooth one, has not been a smooth one, and is unlikely to
be a smooth one in the future. Indeed, when we think about norms related to
humanitarian intervention or the Responsibility to Protect, if anything what we
have seen has been a process of reaction, counter-reaction, counter-counterreaction and counter-counter-counter-reaction. We are still going through that
cycle.
I’ll talk a little bit later about how this might end, but for now, let me say
a little bit more about that cycle of reaction and counter-reaction. Let me start by
offering an extremely abbreviated history of the last two decades of debate about
humanitarian intervention.
Start in the 1990s. The beginning of the 1990s marked the end of the Cold
War, and around the world, political leaders, activists, and scholars struggled to
predict how the Security Council’s role might change with the Cold War deadlock
finally broken.3 With the omnipresent Cold War threat of a nuclear conflict
between the Soviet Union and the United States finally over, the threat of proxy
conflicts between states aligned with one or the other superpowers also came to
an end.4
But even as the threat of inter-state conflict appeared to recede when the
Cold War ended, the world began to experience what appeared to be a resurgence
of messy internal conflicts within states, exemplified by the ethnic conflicts
Rwanda and Bosnia.5 During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the international
community stood by while nearly a million people were slaughtered in a matter of
a few short months.6 In Bosnia the situation was not quite as shameful for the
international community, which did ultimately act—with Security Council
approval—to end the conflict, but most critics felt that the international
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For example, some scholars worried that the unrestrained, interpretive power of the Security
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community did too little, too late.7 The conflict in the Balkans brought
concentration camps back to Europe for the first time since World War II. 8 The
conflict also brought massacres back to Europe: during the Srebrenica massacre in
1995, for instance, an estimated 8,000 unarmed civilians were slaughtered over a
few short days. 9
The glaring inadequacy of the international community’s response to the
crises in Rwanda and Bosnia led to a good deal of hand-wringing, and an
understandable and appropriate sense of guilt.10 The general sense was that the
international community—led by the UN Security Council—should have done
more, or at least should have done something, or really anything in the case of
Rwanda.11 Political leaders, the media and advocacy groups all asked: Can it
possibly be the case that it’s acceptable, legally or morally, for the world to stand
by idly while mass atrocities are committed? In particular, when mass atrocities
are committed against a population by its own government?
Then we come to the Kosovo crisis in 1998 and 1999. This has already
been the subject of much discussion today, so I won’t go into detail. As evidence
mounted of a renewed ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, it became clear that
the Security Council would not authorize the use of military force to end Serbian
ethnic cleansing activities.12 As you know, this was due to veto threats from
China and Russia, which were driven in part because of broad concerns about
shoring up norms of sovereign non-intervention, and—on Russia’s end—by the
historical alliances between Russian and the Serbian authorities.13 This time,
however, the rest of the international community was unwilling to let Security
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Council inaction be the end of the story. Despite the lack of Security Council
authorization—and anxious not to see another Rwanda or Bosnia—the NATO
states decided to take matters into their own hands by launching air strikes against
Serbian forces.14
It’s worth noting, however, that neither NATO nor the United States,
which led the NATO operation, attempted to put forward a formal legal
justification for military intervention in Kosovo.15 The United States and other
NATO powers offered policy and humanitarian justifications for the use of force,
but in the United States, there was a deliberate decision at the State Department
Legal Adviser’s Office to refrain from proffering a legal justification.16
Why not? In part, U.S. and NATO lawyers were unsure if other states
would accept any legal justification they might put forward, and in part, they were
afraid that other states would accept their logic. That is, they didn’t want to put
forward a legal theory that would be roundly repudiated by numerous other states
because that would be embarrassing and would retard the development of any
new norm permitting humanitarian intervention. But, they were equally uneasy
about the longer-term implications of creating a new norm permitting
humanitarian interventions. No one had fully thought through the long-term
repercussions of such a new norm, so at least with regard to the law, the NATO
powers decided that discretion might well be the better part of valor. 17 In effect,
they opted to leave the Kosovo intervention in the realm of the extralegal and let
history be the judge.
History in fact judged the Kosovo intervention fairly kindly.18 Though the
Council had not authorized the military intervention to start with, it gave what
amounted to a retroactive blessing by authorizing NATO troops to reestablish
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See generally NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, NATO,
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last updated July 15, 1999) (providing the history of
NATO’s involvement in the Kosovo conflict). Operation Allied Force began on March 23, 1999
and lasted until July 10, 1999. Id.
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See RAMESH THAKUR, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: NORMS, LAWS AND THE USE OF
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 48 (2011) (“The Clinton administration defended NATO
operations, their huge costs, and the even larger costs of the subsequent reconstruction of Kosovo,
on the argument that something had to be done to oppose totalitarian leaders and stop ethnic
cleansing and oppression.”).
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Id.
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See Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 120 (1999)
(“[M]ost states in the international community are nervous about justifying in advance a type of
operation which might further increase the power of major powers, and might be used against
them.”).
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See THAKUR, supra note 15, at 58–59 (“Critics of the Kosovo war must concede the many
positive accomplishments. Almost a million of Kosovo’s displaced inhabitants returned to their
homeland. Milosevic was thrown out of Kosovo . . . The credibility of NATO was preserved; the
transformation of its role from collective defence of members against attack from the outside, into
the more diffused role of peace-enforcement throughout Europe, was validated; and Washington
remains firmly anchored to Europe.”).





security in Kosovo, in close coordination with the UN mission in Kosovo.19 Thus,
the whole affair worked out pretty well, from a U.S. and NATO perspective.
While a question mark hovered over the issue of legality, the issue of legitimacy
seemed to have been satisfactorily addressed.
This, of course, is part of the process through which new norms of
customary international law are created. Some States act in a certain way; other
States follow suit, praise the action, or at least refrain from criticism; influential
States, such as those on the Security Council, appear to accept the legitimacy of
the acts, and so on. While the States that formed the NATO coalition did not
articulate the norm in legal terms, one could presume that this would eventually
come.20
But as I noted earlier, it’s rarely so simple or linear; rather than a steady
building of consensus, the evolution of customary international law is often
characterized by contestation and cycles of action, reaction, counter-action and
counter-reaction.
Shortly after the Kosovo intervention, Kofi Annan, then the UN Secretary
General, gave a now famous speech.21 In his speech, he articulated the dilemma
confronting the international community after Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo.22 On
the one hand, he argued, it seems crystal clear—both morally speaking and from
the perspective of global stability perspective—that states with the ability to do
something should not merely stand by while mass slaughter takes place.23 How
could such inaction possibly be consistent with the norms that led to the creation
of the UN Charter in the first place?24 Remember, the UN Charter emerged out of
war, and if it was motivated most centrally by the desire to prevent such horrific
inter-state conflict from recurring, it was also motivated by revulsion against the
Holocaust, revulsion against genocide, revulsion against means and methods of
warfare that killed civilians as much as combatants, and a commitment to human
dignity and human rights.25
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NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, supra note 14.
See Roberts, supra note 17, at 102–03 (noting one possible legal justification for NATO’s
involvement in Kosovo and stating that “there are some crimes so extreme that a state responsible
for them, despite the principle of sovereignty, may properly be the subject of military
intervention”).
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Press Release, General Assembly, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General
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two equally compelling interests–universal legitimacy and effectiveness in defence of human
rights–can only be viewed as a tragedy.”).
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On the other hand, Annan highlighted the dangers of permitting states to
intervene militarily in other states without Security Council authorization.26 If
doing nothing in the face of genocide offended one key principle on which the
UN Charter was premised, allowing the unilateral use of force offended the other
key principle: the conviction that if states could decide for themselves when it’s
acceptable to use force inside other states (for reasons other than pressing selfdefense), we face a renewed risk of inter-state conflict.27 The norm of sovereign
non-intervention forms a crucial part of the UN Charter’s collective security
structure, which prohibits the use of force except when authorized by the Security
Council.28 But once you accept that sometimes it’s acceptable for one state to use
armed force inside the borders of another sovereign state for “humanitarian”
purposes, how do you prevent states from using humanitarian claims as a pretext
for interventions motivated by ideology or the desire for domination, territory, or
economic gain? Once you take the Security Council out of the picture, what actor
can evaluate claims of humanitarian crisis and decide which interventions would
be justified, and which would be pretextual?
A lot has happened since then, but fifteen years later, in many ways we’re
still struggling with the same dilemma Kofi Anna articulated in 1999. In
September 1999, for instance, the Security Council passed Resolution 1265 on the
protection of civilians in times of armed conflict.29 This was pretty significant, in
the sense that it was the first time that the Security Council explicitly declared that
it saw itself not only as the guarantor of peace between states, but as a guarantor
of civilian protection even in times of internal armed conflicts.30 In Resolution
1265, the Council “[e]xpresse[d] its willingness to respond to situations of armed
conflict where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians
is being deliberately obstructed, including through the consideration of
appropriate measures at the Council’s disposal in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations.”31 That may sound anodyne, but in the language of the United
Nations, this was a huge shift: it brought matters once considered “internal” to
member states into the Security Council’s declared ambit, and the reference to
“appropriate measures” was understood by all to signal a willingness on the part
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Id. (suggesting that the humanitarian response must be applied fairly and consistently regardless
of region, that intervention must be treated as a last resort, that the international community must
redefine the meaning of a “national interest,” and that the Security Council must be capable of
responding to the conflict before a decision to intervene via a military engagement can be made).
27
See id. (“The choice, as I said during the Kosovo conflict, must not be between Council unity
and inaction in the face of genocide–as in the case of Rwanda, on the one hand; and Council
division, and regional action, as in the case of Kosovo, on the other. In both cases, the Member
States of the United Nations should have been able to find common ground in upholding the
principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity.”).
28
Id. (“The Charter requires the Council to be the defender of the common interest, and unless it is
seen to be so—in an era of human rights, interdependence, and globalization—there is a danger
that others could seek to take its place.”).
29
S.C. Res. 1265, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (Sept. 17, 1999).
30
Id. at ¶ 10.
31
Id.





of the Council to authorize the use of armed force, if needed, for humanitarian
protection purposes.
Meanwhile, efforts continued to find a way out of the dilemma articulated
by Kofi Annan in 1999. Most notably, the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established.32 ICISS consisted of
noted scholars, diplomats, and former high-level officials, and in November of
2001, ICISS published a report called “The Responsibility to Protect.”33 In this
report, ICISS did something smart and novel and in many ways extraordinarily
appealing. In effect, the ICISS report sought to get out of the supposed dilemma
between the moral pull of humanitarian intervention and the moral pull of
sovereignty by redefining the terms of the discussion.34 In particular, ICISS
sought to redefine sovereignty itself: to ICISS, sovereignty is not something that
states possess simply by virtue of being states. ICISS took the view that
sovereignty is a matter of responsibilities as much as rights, and the most
fundamental responsibility of a sovereign State is the protection of its own
population.35 The right to be free of external intervention—long considered a
fundamental attribute of Westphalian sovereignty—is, to ISICC, contingent upon
a state’s ongoing ability to protect its own population.36 A state that cannot (or
will not) protect its population loses, to that same extent, the sovereign privilege
on non-intervention.37
ICISS went a step further, arguing that if a state doesn’t fulfill its
responsibility to protect its own population, the international community has the
responsibility to step in and do something if a state fails to fulfill its
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INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
VII (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT]; THAKUR, supra note 15, at 75 (“Under the impact of
contrasting experiences in Rwanda and Kosovo, Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged
member states to come up with a new consensus on the competing visions of national and popular
sovereignty. Responding to the challenge, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy set up the
ICISS to wrestle with the whole gamut of difficult and complex issues involved in the debate.”).
33
ICISS REPORT, supra note 32.
34
See id. at 17 (noting the evolution the “right to intervene” concept and redefining it as “the
responsibility to protect”). The ICCIS defined the responsibility to protect in terms of three
inherent concepts: 1) evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those in need of support; 2)
acknowledgment that the primary responsibility to protect rests with the state concerned, and that
other states may intervene only when the state itself is unwilling or unable to fulfill this
responsibility or is the perpetrator; and 3) the responsibility to protect includes the responsibility
to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. Id.
35
See id. at 13 (stating that acceptance into the UN re-characterizes the idea of sovereignty into
one where the state becomes responsible for its citizens and their welfare, including both the
state’s own citizens and those in the international community).
36
Id. at 17 (“The Commission believes that responsibility to protect resides first and foremost with
the state whose people are directly affected. This fact reflects not only international law and the
modern state system, but also the practical realities of who is best placed to make a positive
difference.”).
37
Id.





responsibility.38 That external intervention can take many, many forms, of course,
and ICISS was quick to note that most manifestations of the international
community’s responsibility to protect would and should not be military in
nature.39 They could be economic interventions (sanctions, foreign aid); they
could be diplomatic efforts; they could involve various forms of technical
assistance, and so on.40 But as a last resort—and subject to the standard just war
principles of right intention, reasonable prospects of success, etc.—the
international community could turn to armed intervention if needed to protect
civilian populations.41
Two things are worth noting here. One, note how neatly ICISS avoided the
dilemma articulated by Kofi Annan in 1999. Annan articulated a conflict between
norms of sovereignty and norms of humanitarianism.42 ICISS simply redefined
sovereignty to avoid the conflict altogether: to ICISS, sovereignty does not stand
opposed to humanitarian intervention; on the contrary, the most fundamental
responsibilities of sovereignty revolve around humanitarian protection
considerations.43
Second, it’s important to note that ICISS saw the Security Council as an
important but not utterly essential arbiter. While the 2001 ICISS report stated
clearly that it was the Security Council that should evaluate whether a military
intervention was justified by a state’s failure to protect its population, the report
also warned that in particularly compelling and egregious situations, states might
well be justified in bypassing a paralyzed Security Council.44 Normatively, this
makes sense: if the legitimacy of states themselves rests upon their individual and
collective ability to protect the human beings who populate them, then surely the
legitimacy of a group of states—the Security Council for instance—also similarly
rests on that ability to protect human beings from egregious and massive harm. By
implication, if the Security Council is incapable of taking action to protect
populations under threat, it is, to that same extent, delegitimized, and states opting
to take matters into their own hands may do so.
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Id. at 31–32.
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Id. at 54–55.





The arguments made by ICISS were both novel and powerful.45 But the
ICISS report came at an inopportune moment for proponents of humanitarian
intervention. The September 11 attacks preceded the release of the ICISS report
by just two months, and the heated debates about humanitarian intervention that
bedeviled the international community for the previous few years were instantly
displaced by a new set of concerns about terrorism.46 In this sense, the timing of
the ICISS report could not have been worse.
That said, the events of 9/11—and the international community’s
response—could also be viewed as offering further (albeit indirect) support for
ICISS’s “responsibility to protect” theory and for its understanding of
sovereignty. 9/11 illustrated the growing difficulty in defining the realm of
activities that was purely “internal” to a state, versus the realm of issues that can
be regarded as purely “external.” While ICISS articulated the responsibility to
protect as triggered by a state’s sustained failure to protect its own population,
9/11 demonstrated the harms that could result if a state’s failure to control its
“internal” affairs led to the “export” of harm to the populations of other states.47
Consider Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda. The Afghan state was unable or
unwilling to prevent its territory from being used to export massive harm to other
populations outside of Afghanistan—in the form of the thousands of Americans
and others injured or killed in the 9/11 attacks.48
In certain senses, then, the immediate post 9/11 period was an opportune
moment to advance a new theory of sovereignty. The ICISS emphasis on the
responsibility of states to prevent harm to their own populations dovetailed nicely
with the post-9/11 insistence—articulated both by the US and by the Security
Council itself—that states had a responsibility to prevent the export of harm to the
populations of other states (e.g., by harboring terrorists).
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, many of the post 9/11 U.S. arguments
for the use of force for counterterrorism purposes parallel Responsibility to
Protect arguments. Both rest on a similar, though sometimes unarticulated, theory
of sovereignty as being a matter more of privileges and responsibilities rather than
rights, and as being “waivable” if a state fails to fulfill its responsibilities. In a
superficial sense, “responsibility to protect” arguments for humanitarian
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46
See Thomas G. Weiss, R2P After 9/11 and the World Summit, 24 Wis. Int’l L.J. 74, 747–48
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47
See Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Report of the Committee of Experts on Nation
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from Afghanistan.”).
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See Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, FOREIGN AFF. 127, 128 (2002)
(arguing that many failed states are incapable of effectively governing within their own borders,
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intervention and arguments justifying the use of military force to fight terrorism
might seem a world apart. On a deeper structural level, however, they
complement each other, and each legitimizes the other.49
But the action/reaction cycle continued, as events in the years after 9/11
began to complicate nascent support for the “responsibility to protect” norm
articulated first by ICISS. Most significantly, in 2003, the United States invaded
Iraq.50 As you know, the Security Council had not authorized the invasion (though
some made the rather tortured argument that the invasion could be justified via
the ongoing effect of several pre-9/11 resolutions).51 The invasion was mainly
premised on a legal theory justifying acts of “preemptive self-defense,” the notion
being that while Saddam Hussein had not yet used the weapons of mass
destruction he allegedly possessed, he might at any time use them against the
United States, and the United States was therefore justified in taking preemptive
action to eliminate the threat.52 But within a few years, it became clear that
rationale for the invasion of Iraq had relied, at best, on a misunderstanding or
exaggeration of the nature of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime.53 At
worst, and in the eyes of many around the world, the invasion was based simply
on a deliberate effort to misinform both the American public and the world.54
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See ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT TO END MASS
ATROCITIES 33 (2009) [hereinafter BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT] (“The whole concept
of the R2P rests on the idea that sovereignty and human rights are two sides of the same coin, and
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50
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USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 135 (2009) (“Far from clarifying the issue, Resolution
1441 . . . muddied the waters even more. . . . The Security Council officially recognized that Iraq
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force to redress the situation.”).
52
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Conflict Prevention] (“To make matters worse, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was portrayed as an
exercise of preventive war ⎯ particularly by Vice-President Dick Cheney.”).
53
S. REP. NO. 108−301, at 12 (2004) (finding that the Intelligence Community’s October 2002
National Intelligence Estimate, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,”
mischaracterized the intelligence through overstatement and lack of support).
54
See James P. Pfiffner, Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with
Iraq? 34 PRES. STUD. Q. 25, 25−26 (2004) (concluding that the Bush Administration’s “claims
about Iraq’s nuclear capacity were based on dubious evidence that was presented in a misleading
manner”).





To the international community, the U.S. invasion of Iraq served as a
powerful reminder of the dangers of permitting States to use force without
Security Council authorization, and undermined structurally similar arguments
addressing humanitarian intervention.55 In the case of the Kosovo intervention,
the legitimate ends (stopping the ethnic cleansing that was undeniably underway)
were accepted by most states as justifying the extra-legal means (the use of force
without Security Council authorization).56 Perhaps the same might have happened
in Iraq. It’s one of history’s many “what ifs”: what if the United States had ousted
Saddam Hussein, but had not pushed through de-Baathification and had not
disbanded the Iraqi army? What if the U.S. invasion had produced a genuinely
stable, peaceful, and democratic Iraq? Perhaps, in those circumstances, the
international community might have been prepared to overlook the evidence
demonstrating that Iraq had never possessed weapons of mass destruction. But
that’s not what happened: the U.S. military intervention was not only justified
based on misinformation, but was generally perceived as having done more harm
than good both for the Iraqi people and for regional stability.57 For several years,
the Iraq fiasco powerfully discredited other kinds of arguments about military
intervention.58
But time passes, and again the pendulum swung back—at least for a time.
President George W. Bush was succeeded by President Barack Obama, who, at
least as a candidate, was sharply critical of Bush era doctrines of preemptive
armed conflict and associated attitudes towards military intervention.59 Obama
promised to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq and bring the conflict in Afghanistan
to a responsible end, and these promises eased the concerns of many in the
international community.60 Even as then-candidate Obama repudiated the Bush
doctrine of preemptive self-defense, other influential members in his
administration—such as Samantha Power and Susan Rice—publicly embraced the
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Responsibility to Protect, and began to aggressively push it at the United Nations
level, urging the Security Council to reference and endorse the concept.61
They succeeded, in part as a result of a burst of international good will
towards the new Obama administration, and reduced suspicion of the United
States internationally.62 The Security Council made positive reference to the
responsibility to protect in several resolutions,63 and the concept reached its
apotheosis in March of 2011, when the Security Council authorizing the use of
force to protect civilians both in Libya (where NATO took the lead) and in Cote
d’Ivoire (where UN peacekeepers assisted by French troops used force to restore
civil order following post-election violence).64 In both cases, the Council
expressly invoked the Responsibility to Protect.65
This was the high water point for the R2P norm.66 After Libya and Cote
D’Ivoire, there was a brief period in which numerous commentators declared that
R2P had finally “grown up,” achieving, or certainly getting within spitting
distance, the status of a norm of customary international law.67
That period lasted only about three months, however.68 Within months, the
Libya intervention began to appear at least to critics more like a regime change
intervention than a civilian protection intervention.69 Perhaps this was inevitable:
it’s not clear how an intervention intended to protect civilians from predation by
their own government could avoid morphing into a regime change intervention in
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the face of continued government attacks on civilians. Regardless, the shift
towards a straightforward attack on Libyan government forces triggered anxiety
and anger in many states, including, most notably, Russia, China, and South
Africa.70 In their eyes, the United States had arguably tricked the Security Council
into authorizing force for a limited, humanitarian purpose—and had then quickly
moved to depose a sitting government.71 Even if the United States and other
NATO powers had not initially intended the intervention to expand, argued
critics, the conflict in illustrated that using force for civilian protection purposes
could easily end up having unintended consequences.72
So the pendulum once again swung away from norms favoring
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect and towards an
insistence on sovereign non-intervention—or, at the very least, a deep wariness of
interventionist arguments. This is reflected in the UN debate about Syria, where,
despite some 100,000 deaths, the Security Council has been unwilling even to use
“responsibility to protect” terminology in connection with the conflict.73
In the United States, President Obama seems to have taken this to heart, as
evidenced by his conflicted response to events in Syria.74 President Obama has
made it clear he has no appetite for a unilateral humanitarian intervention
intended to protect civilians; inside sources suggest that he is as concerned about
slippery slopes as any U.S. critic.75 In August and September of 2013, however,
Obama—trapped by his own rhetorical declaration that the use of chemical
weapons in Syria would cross a U.S. “red line”—briefly declared his willingness
to use military force for the limited purpose of ending the Assad regime’s ability
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to use chemical weapons against his citizens.76 In the process, he articulated a
legal argument justifying the potential unilateral use of force for the purpose of
protecting civilians, even in the absence of Security Council authorization.77 The
United Kingdom’s prime minister did the same, asserting explicitly that a
humanitarian intervention would be lawful under the circumstances.78 In the
United States, the United Kingdom and France, key surrogates—such as former
U.S. State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh—also advanced arguments
justifying a potential U.S. intervention in Syria.79
These arguments were far from universally accepted.80 The response both
from domestic U.S. constituencies and even many close U.S. allies was sharply
critical.81 The British parliament declined to authorize British participation in any
use of force in Syria,82 and in the United States, it seems quite likely than
Congress would have done the same.83 Ultimately, they were not put to the test, as
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the United States opted against military action when Syria’s government agreed to
surrender its chemical weapons under international supervision.84
There’s an interesting irony here: the legal case for unilateral humanitarian
intervention was articulated most explicitly by several powerful states at the very
moment support for a norm permitting such interventions was at its weakest in
many other states. On the one hand, the Syria debate saw three permanent
members of the Security Council go well beyond previous expressions of support
for the responsibility to protect and explicitly embrace the view that humanitarian
interventions are lawful even in the absence of Security Council authorization. On
the other hand, the Syria debate also shored up opposition to norms permitting
humanitarian intervention, as Russia, China, and other states weighed in to
express their opposition.
To put it a little differently, norms supporting military intervention for
humanitarian purposes—even unilateral intervention—have evolved substantially
in the last two decades, both as a result of the 2001 ICISS report and as a result of
the subsequent embrace of the responsibility to protect by the United States and
other influential states. But even as norms supporting humanitarian intervention
have been articulated, elaborated, and placed on a firmer theoretical and legal
footing, becoming linked to changing norms about sovereignty more generally,
the international consensus supporting such humanitarian interventions has never
been in greater disarray since the end of the Cold War.85
So where are we now, given this cycle of action, reaction, and counterreaction: Do we have a norm of customary international law permitting
humanitarian intervention, or not? And what does the future hold? What does the
ongoing debate about interventions tell us about the world in which we live?
On the first question, I think the honest answer is that customary
international law is in some disarray on this subject. It would be going too far—
after Kosovo, after the Syria debate—to assert that customary international law
clearly prohibits any and all humanitarian interventions undertaken without
Security Council blessing. But it would also be going too far to assert that such
interventions are clearly permitted under customary international law. The law is
unsettled and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
This shouldn’t surprise us. In many ways, the debate about humanitarian
intervention is both part of and a symbol of a broader struggle to understand what
sovereignty can possibly mean in a globalized era. These days, it’s impossible to
draw clear lines between the internal and the external–the foreign and the
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domestic.86 What can sovereignty mean, in an era in which “internal” civil
conflict easily spills beyond borders, and in which modern communications
technologies—Twitter, YouTube, and so on—make the moral impact of conflict
global and immediate? Looked at through the lens of economics or climate or
public health, borders are increasingly meaningless, and states have less and less
ability to function autonomously. (In some states, all states today intervene
constantly in the internal affairs of all other states, whether they know it or not—
and even whether they like it or not).87 From a security perspective, too,
traditional conceptions of sovereignty have been undermined: as the 9/11 attacks
made clear, what happens in Afghanistan (or Mali or Yemen) cannot be expected
to stay in Afghanistan (or Mali or Yemen).88 Lethal harm can be exported across
borders more rapidly—and by an ever-widening range of non-state actors—than
ever before.
Indeed, it’s no coincidence that arguments about the use of force for
counterterrorism purposes are structurally similar to arguments about the
responsibility to protect. If a state’s inability or unwillingness to protect its own
population makes it subject to external intervention for the purpose of population
protection, why shouldn’t a state’s inability or unwillingness to protect other
states’ populations from the consequences of activities inside its borders render it
similarly subject to external intervention? (Note that this is not the same as
traditional arguments justifying the use of force in national self-defense, though it
overlaps with such arguments. The theory of sovereignty that undergirds the
responsibility to protect offers an alternative logic justifying intervention. A logic
that, taken to its extreme, would allow states considering military intervention to
bypass traditional requirements of imminence and use force even when the threats
are directed at third-party states).
I find myself actually profoundly ambivalent about all this. The
arguments that have emerged in favor of the responsibility to protect—and
indeed, for counterterrorism-based interventions—have a tremendous amount of
moral legitimacy to them in this globalized world. At the same time, however
inadequate we may find traditional conceptions of sovereignty, sovereignty is one
of the sole bulwarks against a renewed era of interstate conflict. Because Kofi
Annan’s 1999 warnings still ring true: once you open up the door to unilateral
military intervention—once you have a norm permitting a single state to decide
for itself when a situation justifies the use of armed force—what will prevent a
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slide back towards the kind of dangerous free-for-all the UN Charter was
designed to prevent?
This is where we are right now, and we don’t have the answer to that
dilemma. In an ideal sense, the way out of this dilemma lies in developing more
robust, responsive and accountable forms of international governance. That’s the
logic of the situation in which we find ourselves: in the age of globalization, we
need, more than ever, an empowered global referee committed both to stability
and to human dignity—a global referee that can make these difficult decisions
about when and where to use force, so it’s not just one state’s views against
another’s.
We don’t, of course, have anything close to this more robust system of
international governance right now. We should surely strive for it—it is surely in
the ultimate interest of all states. How else can we prevent the erosion of
traditional norms of sovereignty from leading to a slide towards conflict and
instability? How else can we address urgent collective problems such as climate
change?
I’m not particularly optimistic that we will get there, however. In the notso-distant past, we humans demonstrated a remarkable incapacity to make clearly
necessary changes incrementally and peacefully. Think of the major inflection
points in international law: the Peace of Westphalia, or the post World War II
creation of the UN Charter system.89 The bursts of creativity and change
symbolized by the emergence of the Westphalian order or the UN system did not
emerge out of peaceful collaboration between States.90 On the contrary, these
dramatic changes in the international system arose out of cataclysm. The religious
wars that wracked Europe before the Peace of Westphalia left nearly a third of the
population dead in parts of Central Europe.91 World Wars I and II were nearly as
devastating, leaving tens of millions dead and many of Europe’s great cities in
ruins.92
There is nothing inevitable about progress (in the international domain or
any other domain). Perhaps today’s international system will gradually and
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peacefully morph into a more powerful, equitable, and effective system of global
governance—but perhaps it won’t. Perhaps instead the current system will
collapse as catastrophically as the pre-World War II international order. Change is
inevitable, but it not inevitably for the better; even when the ultimate outcome is
good, the process of change may be neither pleasant nor gentle. We think of the
post World War II UN Charter system as “better” that the rules and institutions
that preceded it—but that “better” system could only be built on the ruins of the
old system.
It will take a really concerted effort and a whole lot of luck for us to
stagger and stumble our way towards a stronger, more stable, and more human
rights friendly international system. If we don’t have that much like, and we may
very well not, we would easily find ourselves back in a situation of very
substantial global instability and conflict.
This is the central insight I struggle to communicate when I teach
international law. We all have such a “presentist” bias. We assume that today’s
weather is the best predictor of tomorrow’s weather, and statistically, so it is:
tomorrow’s weather is overwhelmingly likely to resemble today’s weather. Until
the day it doesn’t, that is. Similarly, we assume that tomorrow, the international
order will probably look a whole lot like it looks today. This will also be true,
right up to the day it’s not. Think of it like this: none of our intelligence agencies
predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union, or the Arab Spring and the rapid ouster
of several Middle Eastern despots, for that matter.93 Systems can seem very
stable, but the fact that a system has not yet collapsed doesn’t mean it’s in a state
of equilibrium.94 Unstable systems can persist for long periods then collapse very
suddenly.95
This, then, is the central challenge for those of you who care about
international law: we inhabit an unstable international order premised on
increasingly contested norms. Can we do anything to ensure the resiliency and
adaptability of the current system—can we help nudge it towards something more
responsive and robust? Or will we just watch in dismay as it falls to pieces around
us?
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